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 The term Lost Cause originated in 1866 when a 
Virginia journalist named Edward A. Pollard published a 
book with that title which blamed Jefferson Davis for the 
defeat of the Confederate States of America.  For many 
years now the term has referred to and embodied a 
romanticized, mythical view of the Old South in regard to 
the Civil War.  As Georgia history professor David Williams 
notes, the Lost Cause projects an image “of an idyllic South, 
populated by a chivalric race of cavaliers who were kind 
masters to happy slaves–a utopian South, beaten and broken 
by superior northern numbers and industry . . . ” 
 Although the Lost Cause is mythology, it is still viewed 
as historical truth by many credulous persons and even 
defended as an accurate account of the past by various pro-
South groups (as well as by racist demagogues).  This year 
marks the 150th anniversary of the bombardment of Ft. 
Sumter and the outbreak of the Civil War.  What better time 
to demythologize the Lost Cause?  Therefore, I will now 
expose the dubiousness of nine of the most important myths 
of the Lost Cause.  I rely on an impressive, growing body of 
Civil War literature by history professors and other scholars 
that step by step, again and again, usually without any 
serious contradiction, has demonstrated that the Lost Cause 
is a false cause. 
Myth No. 1  The principal reason the Southern states seceded 
was states’ rights, not slavery. 
 Although no one denies that the issue of states’ rights 
was of vital importance in the Old South, the overwhelming 
consensus among modern historians is that slavery was the 
single most important reason the Southern states seceded.  
Secession occurred principally because the South dearly 
loved and passionately desired to vindicate the institution of 
black slavery. 
 South Carolina was the first state to secede.  On Dec. 24, 
1860, four days after approving the Ordinance of Secession, 
the state’s Secession Convention approved a “Declaration of 
the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the 
Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union.”  This 
weird document–passed by god-fearing white Southerners 
who believed that God is a proslavery deity, that the Bible is 
a proslavery book, and that no true Christian could be 
opposed to slavery–proves beyond a reasonable doubt that 
slavery was the main impetus for that state’s decision to 
secede.  Almost all the grievances listed to justify splitting 
the Union involve slavery, slavery, slavery.  The bizarre 
document even states: 
 “Those [Northern, free] States have assumed the right 
of deciding upon the propriety of our domestic institutions 
[slavery]; and have denied the rights of property [slavery] 
established in fifteen of the States and recognized by the 
Constitution; they have denounced as sinful the institution of 
slavery; they have permitted open establishment among 
them of [antislavery] societies, whose avowed object is to 
disturb the peace and to eloign the [slave] property of the 
citizens of other States. They have encouraged and assisted 
thousands of our slaves to leave their homes; and those who 
remain, have been incited by emissaries, books and pictures 
to servile insurrection.”  (My italics.)  
 Alexander Stephens, a Georgian who was Vice 
President of the Confederate States of America, delivered a 
speech in Savannah on March 21, 1861.  This speech, known 
as the “Cornerstone Speech,” is powerful evidence that it 
was mainly the issue of slavery that led to the dissolution of 
the Union and the consequent formation of the Confederacy.  
In the course of his infamous speech, Stephens said: 
 “The new [Confederate] constitution has put at rest, 
forever, all the agitating questions relating to our peculiar 
institution African slavery as it exists amongst us the proper 
status of the negro [sic] in our form of civilization.  This was 
the immediate cause of the late rupture and present revolution. 
. . . The prevailing ideas entertained by [Thomas Jefferson] 
and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the 
formation of the old constitution, were that the enslavement 
of the African was in violation of the laws of nature; that it 
was wrong in principle, socially, morally, and politically.  It 
was an evil they knew not well how to deal with, but the 
general opinion of the men of that day was that, somehow or 
other in the order of Providence, the institution would be 
evanescent and pass away. . . . Those ideas, however, were 
fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the assumption of 
the equality of races. This was an error. It was a sandy 
foundation, and the government built upon it fell when the 
‘storm came and the wind blew.’ 
 “Our new government is founded upon exactly the 
opposite idea; its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests, 
upon the great truth that the negro [sic] is not equal to the 
white man; that slavery subordination to the superior race is 
his natural and normal condition. This, our new government, 
is the first, in the history of the world, based upon this great 
physical, philosophical, and moral truth.”  (My italics.)  
Myth No. 2  In the winter of 1860-1861, prior to the firing on 
Ft. Sumter, there was overwhelming Southern support for 
secession. 
 In the months before Ft. Sumter was bombarded on 
April 12, 1861, the South was, as Georgia history professor 
David Williams explains in his book Deeply Divided: The 
South’s Inner Civil War (2008), “badly divided” on the issue 
of secession, as the elections for members of the various state 
secession conventions demonstrated.  “Throughout the Deep 
South, official returns gave secession’s opponents about 40 
percent of the popular vote.”  Opponents of secession 
(known as unionists or co-operationists) “ran neck and neck 
with secessionists in Alabama and Louisiana. . . .  In Texas, 
two-thirds of voters opposed secession.”  Additionally, pro-
secession elements committed so much widespread fraud at 
the ballot box and in the vote-counting that “the returns 
cannot be trusted as a gauge of popular opinion.  Most 
likely, anti-secession sentiment was considerably stronger 
than the final vote would suggest.”  Here in Georgia, 
Williams points out, secessionist Governor Joe Brown 
“falsely claimed that secessionist delegates had carried the 
state by over thirteen thousand votes.  In fact, existing 
records from the time suggest that secession was probably 
defeated by just over a thousand votes.” 
 Throughout the Southern states, secessionists used 
coercion and subterfuge to discourage or prevent opponents 
of secession from voting against secession. “So worried were 
secessionist leaders over the possibility of secession being 
voted down that they used intimidation and violence in their 
efforts to control the ballot box wherever they could.” 
 The current historical consensus that there was broad-
based opposition to secession throughout the Old South in 
the months immediately preceding April 1861 is summarized 
by David Potter in his book Lincoln and His Party in the 
Secession Crisis (1995): 
 “At no time during the winter of 1860-1861 was 
secession desired by a majority of the people in the slave 
states. . . .  Furthermore, secession was not basically desired 
even by a majority in the lower South, and the secessionists 
succeeded less because of the intrinsic popularity of their 
program than because of the extreme skill with which they 
utilized an emergency psychology . . .” 
Myth No. 3  After Ft. Sumter was fired on there was no 
significant opposition to secession in the South. 
 Although the South was electrified and the secession 
cause hugely strengthened during what David Williams calls 
“the passionate post-Sumter excitement,” nonetheless “there 
were large cracks in the facade of southern unity.”  Williams 
gives examples: in eastern Tennessee, two-thirds of the 
voters voted against approving the legislature’s secession 
ordinance; in North Carolina, nearly one-third of the 
delegates at the state’s secession convention were unionists; 
and in Virginia, the election which ratified secession “was 
rife with fraud and intimidation [against opponents of 
secession].”  
Myth No. 4  Unlike the North, the South during the Civil War 
respected civil liberties, did not abuse its arrest powers, and did 
not imprison supposedly disloyal citizens.    
 This myth has been exploded by historian Mark E. 
Neely, Jr., in two books: Confederate Bastille: Jefferson Davis 
and Civil Liberties (1993), and Southern Rights: Political 
Prisoners and the Myth of Confederate Constitutionalism 
(1999).  Neely points out that “the Confederate government 
curtailed many civil liberties and imprisoned troublesome 
citizens.  Moreover, many white Confederate citizens 
submitted docilely to being treated as only slaves could have 
been treated in the antebellum South.”  Passports were 
required, for example, for civilians who traveled by train, 
and Confederate citizens attempting to board trains “were 
likely to have irritating encounters with military officials who 
asked them nosy questions about their identity and 
destination.  Guards and inquisitors confronted citizens on 
every railroad and at many crossroads.” 
 After arduous research, Neely discovered records 
proving that at least “4,108 civilian prisoners [were] held by 
military authority in the Confederacy.  There were many 
more political prisoners than these, but I was able to locate 
records by name for only 4,108 in some five years of 
searching.”  Neely also discovered that “the Confederate 
Army’s first arrest of a citizen occurred on 14 April 1861, 
even before President Abraham Lincoln called out troops to 
suppress the rebellion.”  Finally, Neely discovered that “the 
number of civilians arrested by military authority in the 
Confederacy, when adjusted for population differences, 
appears to be about the same as the number arrested in the 
North.”  
 Neely concludes: “Knowledge of the existence of 
thousands of political prisoners now reverses our basic 
understanding of the Confederate Cause. . . .  [T]he 
Confederate government restricted civil liberties as modern 
democratic nations did in war.” 
Myth No. 5  Disloyalty was not a major problem in the 
Confederacy. 
 This myth began crumbling years ago with the 
publication of Georgia Lee Tatum’s Disloyalty in the 
Confederacy (1934).  More recent works include Jon L. 
Wakelyn, Confederates Against the Confederacy: Essays on 
Leadership and Loyalty (2002); William W. Freehling, The 
South vs. The South: How Anti-Confederate Southerners 
Shaped the Course of the Civil War (2001); and Maurice 
Melton, Disloyal Confederates, 16 Civil War Times Illustrated 
12 (August 1977).  (The related topic of the massive number 
of desertions from the Confederate army is examined in 
Mark A. Weitz, More Damning Than Slaughter: Desertion in 
the Confederate Army (2005).) 
 There is insufficient space here to survey the enormous 
amount of evidence adduced by numerous scholars for the 
existence of what Ms. Tatum calls the “widespread 
disaffection in the Confederacy.”  It will suffice to quote this 
passage from her book: “[T]here were a few at the beginning 
of the war and many before the end of the war [who] did not 
stand loyally behind Jefferson Davis and the Stars and Bars 
in support of the Confederacy.  While many showed their 
disaffection only by refusing to fight for, or to give active 
support to, the Confederacy, others went so far as to organize 
not only for self-protection but also for injury to the 
Confederacy and aid to the Union.  Before the close of the 
war there was considerable disaffection in every state of the 
Confederacy, and many of the disloyal formed into bands–in 
some states into well organized secret treasonable societies, of 
which the most potent and pernicious were the Order of the 
Heroes of America, the Peace Society, and the Peace and 
Constitutional Society.” 
Myth No. 6  Hardly any Southern white men joined the Union 
army and fought for the North. 
 This myth has been demolished by two books: Charles 
C.  Anderson, Fighting by Southern Federals (1912), and 
Richard Nelson Current, Lincoln’s Loyalists: Union Soldiers 
from the Confederacy (1992).  We now know that around 
100,000 white males from Confederate states served in the 
Union army, compared to around 900,000 Southerners who 
served in the Confederate army.  As Current notes, “the 
100,000 who fought for the Union represented a loss of 10 
percent of the Confederacy’s military manpower.  In reality, 
the Confederacy suffered a double loss, since the 100,000 
loyalists must not only be subtracted from the strength of the 
Confederacy but also be added to the strength of the Union.” 
Myth No. 7  During the Civil War Southern black slaves 
loyally supported their masters and backed the Confederate 
cause. 
 The vilest of the myths of the Lost Cause is the “faithful 
slave” myth–the fiction that during the Civil War Southern 
slaves were on the side of the Confederacy.  The truth is the 
exact opposite.  There are mountains of evidence that black 
slaves all over the South did whatever they could to impede 
and undermine the Confederate cause and to support the 
Union cause.   
 Thus, in Bitterly Divided, Prof. Williams notes: 
 • “Slaves resisted slavery by feigning ignorance or 
illness, sabotaging plantation equipment, and roaming freely 
in defiance of the law.” 
 • Countless slaves ran away from their masters, and 
“[t]hose who did not escape gave aid to those who did.” 
 • Many black slaves spied for the Union.  “Very often 
[Union] intelligence came from escaping slaves, who brought 
news of fortifications, military movements, and Confederate 
troop strength. . . . There was even a black Union spy in the 
Confederate White House.” 
 • “In May 1862 Roberts Smalls and several other slaves 
ran the transport steamer Planter, with its cargo of 
ammunition and artillery, out of Charleston harbor and 
turned it over to blockading Federals.” 
 • “Over two hundred thousand African Americans 
served with the Union’s land and naval forces during the 
Civil War.  More than three-fourths of them were 
southerners, most formerly enslaved.” 
 Williams concludes: 
 “Southern blacks undermined the Confederate war 
effort whenever they could.  They gave refuge to deserters 
[from the Confederate army], carried food to deserter gangs 
and fugitive slaves, spied for the Union army, and aided those 
headed for Union lines.  As a grateful former Union prisoner 
of war later wrote, ‘They were always ready to help anybody 
opposed to the Rebels.  Union refugees, Confederate 
deserters, escaped prisoners–all received from them the same 
prompt and invariable kindness.’” 
Myth No. 8   The South lost the Civil War due to external 
causes rather than internal ones. 
 Strictly speaking, this is not a myth, but it is an 
obsolescent view of why the Confederacy was defeated.  
Traditionally, the principal explanations for the defeat of the 
Confederacy have fallen into two categories: “external 
causes” explanations, and “internal causes” explanations.   
Under the external-causes approach, the North’s victory is 
attributed to its superior material and economic resources 
and its victories on the battlefield.  Until recently, the 
external-causes explanations predominated in scholarly 
writings.  In recent years, however, support for the internal-
causes explanations has been steadily growing, and the most 
important recent scholarship emphasizes internal-causes 
explanations over external-causes explanations. 
 Under the internal-causes approach, the South lost 
because of what took place within the Confederacy itself.  
Today most scholars who embrace the internal-causes 
explanations focus on what is called the South’s “inner civil 
war.”  According to this inner-civil war thesis, the 
Confederacy collapsed because of defeatism, disloyalty, 
disaffection, lack of unifying nationalism, corruption, class 
and sectional conflicts, feuding within the Confederate 
government itself and between the Confederate government 
and the Confederate states, and because of massive 
opposition to such unpopular Confederate war measures as 
habeas corpus suspension, martial law, conscription, and 
impressment of private property. 
 Under the current approach, therefore, the South was 
not tragically but heroically crushed to pieces under the iron 
heel of superior Northern resources.  Rather, in the words of 
Prof. Williams, “it was southerners themselves as much as 
anyone else who were responsible for Confederate defeat.”  
The Lost Cause view of why the South lost relies on the 
falsehood that during the Civil War the South was united in 
supporting the Confederacy. 
 For a few of the recent scholarly works that have 
contributed to the new prominence of the internal-conflict 
explanations for the Confederate States of America’s defeat, 
see Eric Foner, The South’s Inner Civil War, American 
Heritage 46 ((March 1989), and David Osher and Peter 
Wallenstein, Why the Confederacy Lost: An Essay Review, 88 
Md. Hist. Magazine 95 (1993). 
Myth No. 9  John Wilkes Booth and his small band of misfits 
planned and carried out Abraham Lincoln’s assassination and 
their other crimes on their own, and the Confederate 
government had nothing to do with the assassination. 
 To the contrary, in two 2005 Flagpole articles, Lincoln 
Assassinated! and Lincoln Assassinated!, Part 2, which were 
based on the latest historical research, I explained that the 
Confederacy was not entirely free from guilt in the Lincoln 
assassination.  I pointed out: 
 • The Confederate States of America had secret services 
which carried out espionage, counterintelligence, sabotage, 
and covert operations. 
 • John Wilkes Booth was a Confederate secret services 
operative. 
 • Agents of the Confederate secret services plotted 
clandestine operations involving terrorist acts. 
 • In 1864 the Confederate secret services plotted to 
abduct Lincoln, who was to be seized a few miles north of 
Washington, D.C. by a party of armed men who would 
transport their captive into Confederate territory where he 
would be held prisoner in an effort to force the North to 
agree to the independence of the South. 
 • Jefferson Davis and other top Confederate leaders 
personally approved the Lincoln abduction plan, and the 
person designated to be in charge of carrying out the 
kidnaping operation was John Wilkes Booth. 
 • Only two weeks before Lincoln’s assassination, 
Jefferson Davis approved a plot to kill Lincoln and his entire 
Cabinet with a bomb that would be detonated at the White 
House, and the Union did not succeed in putting the 
operation out of action until April 10, 1865, four days before 
Lincoln was assassinated at Ford’s Theater. 
 • The bomb plan only failed because the explosives 
expert from a Confederate secret service who had been 
detailed to detonate the bomb was, while being escorted to 
Washington, D.C. by Confederate cavalry, unexpectedly 
captured by Union cavalry a mere 15 miles from the District. 
 • Although he was not involved in the unsuccessful bomb 
plot, Booth almost certainly knew of it; and in what was 
surely no coincidence, Booth began planning to shoot Lincoln 
on April 12, the day after a newspaper account revealed the 
capture of the Confederate agent who was supposed to 
detonate the bomb at the White House. 
 • Booth’s plot to shoot Lincoln personally, and to 
simultaneously have coconspirators murder the vice 
president and the secretary of state, was intended to cause 
the same type of damage and havoc the White House bomb 
explosion plot had been expected to cause. 
 • At least three of Booth’s sidekicks, Lewis Powell, 
Samuel Mudd, and John Surratt, had engaged in 
Confederate clandestine operations.   
 • On his escape route through Maryland and Virginia 
after assassinating Lincoln, John Wilkes Booth traveled 
along the path of an underground Confederate spy network 
which had been used to secretly transport persons and goods 
to and from the Confederacy, and as he moved along this 
route Booth received assistance from members of the 
clandestine organization operating the network. 
